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GROWTH CONTROL BY THE BALLOT BOX:
CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. *
M. Thomas Jacobson**
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, many citizens, especially those in states exper-
iencing dramatic population growth, have expressed outrage at the ill
effects of unbridled real estate development. They have become fed up
with the deteriorating quality of life, characterized by unprecedented
traffic congestion, poor air quality, loss of open space, and a host of other
maladies.
In California, voters in many of the state's cities and counties have
reacted by using the initiative process to directly enact local growth con-
trols. This Article begins by briefly describing California's experience in
coping with dramatic population growth. It then examines the general
legal basis for growth control measures. Next, the Article considers Cali-
fornia's statutory mechanisms for the enactment of growth control legis-
lation by voters, as well as some of the limitations on the use of initiatives
for this purpose. The Article also discusses two California statutory pro-
visions that may allow developers to "lock in" development rights de-
spite subsequently enacted growth-restricting regulations. Finally, the
Article briefly discusses some criticisms of "ballot box planning" as a
means of regulating land use.
* Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. graduated from the University of San Francisco School of Law in
1957. He served as Assistant Secretary of the California State Senate, Counsel to the Assem-
bly Committee on Local Government, Deputy City Attorney of the City of Richmond, Cali-
fornia and, from 1965 until 1982, City Attorney of Walnut Creek, California. He has lectured
and written on local government and land use for the University of California Extension and
California Continuing Education of the Bar, and has authored several books dealing with the
Subdivision Map Act and California land use and planning law. Mr. Curtin is a partner with
the Walnut Creek office of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen; his practice emphasizes
local government and land-use law for both private and public-sector clients.
** M. Thomas Jacobson graduated with honors from Hastings College of the Law and
received a masters degree in city planning from the University of California, Berkeley. He has
been an instructor in the area of land use for the University of California Extension and has
written on a variety of land use topics. Mr. Jacobson is an associate in the land use and local
government group of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen.
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II. GRowTH CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA: AN OVERVIEW
During the past two decades, California cities and counties have en-
acted a variety of growth control measures.' These measures include
council-enacted interim ordinances2 and permanent measures, 3 and
voter-initiated measures.4 According to a 1988 survey conducted by the
League of California Cities in cooperation with the County Supervisors'
Association of California,5 seventy-one percent of California cities sur-
veyed have enacted some type of growth restriction.6 Additionally, over
seventy-five percent of California's fifty-eight counties have some form of
growth restriction.7
A large number of these growth control measures have been direct
expressions of citizen concern, adopted by popular vote through the initi-
ative process. Between 1971 and 1990, a total of 202 growth control
measures were placed on local ballots in cities and counties throughout
California.' One hundred thirty-six of these measures have been placed
before the voters since January 1986. 9 The most growth control meas-
ures to appear on a single ballot was thirty-eight in 1990, of which eight-
een-or approximately forty-seven percent-passed. 10
Interestingly, the passage rate for these measures has steadily de-
1. See LeGates, The Emergence of Flexible Growth Management Systems in the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area, 24 Loy. L.A.L. RnV. 1035 (1991) for a discussion of various growth control
ordinances enacted in Northern California cities.
2. Section 65858 of the California Government Code authorizes a city to adopt, as an
urgency measure, an interim ordinance prohibiting, for specified periods of time, land uses that
may be in conflict with a general plan amendment, specific plan adoption or amendment, or
rezoning that the city is contemplating. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65858 (West 1983 & Supp.
1991).
3. "Permanent" growth control measures, in contrast to interim measures, are typically
achieved through general plan amendments and/or enactments affecting the various regula-
tions that implement the general plan. Note that even "permanent" measures are subject to
amendment and repeal. Id.
4. The California Constitution enables voters to propose legislation and have it placed
before the electorate for possible enactment. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8-11. This is known as
the initiative power.
5. M. Glickfeld & N. Levine, The New Land Use Regulation "Revolution": Why Cali-
fornia's Local Jurisdictions Enact Growth Control and Management Measures (June 22, 1990)
(unpublished manuscript available from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 26 Trowbridge
Street, Cambridge, MA 02138).
6. Id at 18.
7. Id.
8. CALIFORNIA AWS'N OF REALTORS, Summary of Local Land Use Measures (Jan. 8,
1991), in CALIFORNIA BALLOT MONITOR para. I (rev. ed. Jan. 1991) (available from the Cali-
fornia Association of Realtors, 525 South Virgil Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90020).
9. Id para. II(A) (Dec. 6, 1990).
10. Id
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eined over the past few years.'1 In 1986 and 1987, two-thirds of all
growth control measures passed.' 2 Since that time, increasing numbers
of initiatives are being placed on the ballot, yet fewer are being enacted.
Indeed, the passage rate for growth control measures declined in 1989 to
approximately forty-three percent,' 3 increasing slightly in 1990 to forty-
seven percent.
14
However, despite the recently declining passage rate of growth con-
trol measures, there is no indication that the public interest in placing
these measures on the ballot has abated. As growth-related problems
continue to escalate in California cities and counties, local initiative cam-
paigns directed at all types of land use issues, including growth, seem
unlikely to pass from the political scene. In California, where the popu-
lation is increasing at a rate of approximately three-quarters of a million
per year," voters will likely continue to react to growth by turning to the
ballot box.
A. Motivations for Growth Control
Two basic motivations underlie proposals for growth control. One
is the concern that increased development will overburden a city's ex-
isting infrastructure and its ability to provide public services. Common
areas of concern are overtaxed sewer capacity, overcrowded schools,
water shortages and congested roads. 6
A second, although not completely distinct motivation, focuses on
"quality of life" concerns. These concerns typically reflect a desire to
maintain a community's "character" by preserving open space, including
agricultural, recreational, scenic and environmentally sensitive lands, re-
taining lower population densities and, in some cases, simply restricting
population growth.' 7 Avoiding traffic congestion is an especially com-
mon quality of life concern, making "gridlock" a buzzword in many
campaigns to enact growth control measures.' 8
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id (6 out of 14 measures passed).
14. Id (18 out of 38 measures passed).
15. M. Glickfeld & N. Levine, supra note 5, at 2.
16. Id at 34.
17. For example, voters in the City of Morgan Hill passed an initiative in November 1990
(Measure P) that, in part, set a growth rate of 2.5% annually with a target population of
38,000 in the year 2010. Local Land Use Measures Summary (Dec. 5, 1990), in CALIFORNIA
BALLOT MONITOR, supra note 8, at 2. Similarly, in 1973, the City of Petaluma adopted a plan
limiting residential development to 500 units per year. Id (June 26, 1990), at 1.
18. M. Glickfeld & N. Levine, supra note 5, at 34, tables 10A, 10B.
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B. Types of Growth Control Measures
Growth control is typically achieved by amending a city's19 general
plan,2" or by amending the various mechanisms for implementing the
general plan, including specific plans21 and zoning ordinances. These are
the basic tools of land use regulation in California and, as such, they have
proven appropriate for the task of controlling growth.
Most of the earliest growth control measures, enacted in the 1970s,
focused on residential growth. 22 City legislators and voters have contin-
ued to enact limitations on residential development.23 Some of these
measures impose moratoria on residential development pending the pro-
vision of adequate public services and facilities.24 Others place annual
limits on new construction. 25 Still others require lower residential densi-
ties26 or restrict development of open space lands.27
In addition to limitations on residential development, restrictions on
commercial and industrial development have increasingly become the
goal of citizen efforts in cities of all sizes, including Los Angeles and San
Francisco.' These measures take the form of limits on building height,
29
19. Throughout this Article, the term "city" is often intended to mean "county" as well;
"city council" is likewise often intended to include "county board of supervisors." Where the
provisions for cities and counties vary, an attempt has been made to indicate the differences.
20. A general plan is the basic land use charter governing the direction of future land use
in the local jurisdiction. Lesher Communications v. City of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531,
542, 802 P.2d 317, 323, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1990).
21. A specific plan implements the general plan by providing a detailed plan for the devel-
opment of a specific area. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65450-65453 (West 1983).
22. See Local Land Use Measures Summary (June 26, 1990), in CALIFORNIA BALLOr
MONITOR, supra note 8, at 1-3 [hereinafter Measures Summary (June 26, 1990)].
23. For example, the voters of Contra Costa County in November 1990 passed Measure C
(an initiative sponsored by the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors) that establishes a
"65/35" land preservation plan where: 1) 65% of all land is preserved for non-urban uses,
such as agriculture, open space, wetlands, parks, etc.; and 2) urban development is confined to
35% of County land. Id. (Dec. 5, 1990), at 1.
24. For example, voters in the cities of Livermore (Measure B) and Pleasanton passed
initiatives in 1972 imposing moratoria on the issuance of building permits pending resolution
of deficiencies in public facilities. Id (June 26, 1990), at 1.
25. For example, voters in the City of Oceanside passed an initiative in 1987 (Proposition
A) limiting the total number of homes built each year. kd at 12.
26. For example, voters in the City of Alameda passed an initiative in 1973 (Measure A) to
amend the city charter to prevent the construction of multiple-family units except for replace-
ment of low income and senior housing. Id at 1.
27. For example, the voters in Solano County passed an initiative in 1984 (Proposition A)
aimed in part at protecting agricultural land. Id at 5.
28. CALIFORNIA ASS'N OF REALTORS, supra note 8, para. IV.
29. For example, voters in the City of Walnut Creek passed an initiative in 1985 (Measure
A) limiting building heights to six stories. Measures Summary (June 26, 1990), supra note 22,
at 6.
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annual caps on office space development,3 0 and moratoria on develop-
ments above a given size until specified public service requirements are
met or traffic is reduced to identified levels.31
One especially interesting group of measures places aspects of the
land use regulation process itself exclusively in the hands of voters.
These measures require voter approval of future actions as widely varied
as general plan amendments, 32 expenditures for major public works
projects,33 new hotel and motel construction,34 sewer line extensions,35
and approval of developments above a certain size.36 While these provi-
sions do not restrict development per se, they have the potential of hav-
ing this effect. They are of special interest because they change the very
manner in which land use decisions will be made by involving the voters
directly in certain types of land use decisions.
III. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR, AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON,
GROWTH CONTROL
The legal basis for land use regulation is a city's police power-the
authority of a city to act to protect the health, safety and welfare of its
residents.37 The police power, as it applies to land use regulation, has
been interpreted broadly.38 In an oft-quoted statement of this principle,
United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas stated that the
public welfare includes aesthetic and spiritual values, as well as physical
and monetary ones. 39 Thus, "[l]t is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
30. For example, voters in the City of San Francisco passed an initiative in 1986 (Proposi-
tion M) reducing by fifty percent the amount of permissible office construction. Id- at 10.
31. For example, voters in the City of Walnut Creek passed an initiative in 1985 (Measure
H) establishing a moratorium on many new major developments until traffic is reduced to
specified levels. Id. at 7.
32. For example, voters in Solano.County passed an initiative in 1984 (Proposition A)
which requires voter approval of certain types of general plan amendments. Id. at 5.
33. For example, voters in Valley Center passed an initiative in 1988 (Proposition B) re-
quiring voter approval of expenditures by a water district for major projects. Id. at 16.
34. For example, voters in the City of Monterey passed an initiative in 1986 (Measure E)
to require voter approval of hotelmotel construction in specified areas. Id at 9.
35. For example, voters in the City of Modesto passed an initiative in 1979 (Measure A)
requiring voter approval of sewer line extensions into urban reserve areas. I&. at 2.
36. For example, the voters in the City of Del Mar passed an initiative in 1986 (Measure
B) requiring voter approval for all future development over 25,000 square feet in the City's
central commercial zone. Id at 8.
37. See, eg., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-32 (1954) (police power "is essentially the
product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government").
38. Id. at 35-36.
39. Id at 33.
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spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."'
The police power, though established by common law, is also set
forth in various state constitutions."1 The California Constitution, for
example, confers on cities the power to "make and enforce within [their]
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
in conflict with general laws." 42 A city's exercise of its police power will
generally be upheld against an equal protection or due process-based
constitutional challenge if it bears a reasonable relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose. 3 Three landmark cases have illuminated
how this standard applies in the context of growth control measures.
The first major case was Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo."4 In
Ramapo, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a measure which regu-
lated the timing and sequential control of residential subdivision activity
for periods of up to eighteen years.4" This was the first instance of a state
high court and the United States Supreme Court upholding the uncom-
pensated restriction of development by means of timed and sequential
phasing under the due process clause. The techniques upheld in Ramapo
included: (1) linking timing and sequencing of development with capital
improvements;' (2) tying the purchase of development easements to re-
duced tax assessments;' and (3) integrating the development plan, the
capital improvement budget and the zoning ordinance.4"
The leading California case upholding the concept of growth control
is Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma.49 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the City of
Petaluma's plan, fixing its housing development growth rate at 500
dwelling units per year for a five-year period, and directing that building
permits be divided evenly between single-family and multiple-family resi-
dential units."0 The Petaluma City Council had declared that its ulti-
40. Id
41. See, ag., CAL. CONST. art XI, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § l(f); N.Y. CONsT. art.
XVII, § 3.
42. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
43. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 604, 557 P.2d 473,
485, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 53 (1976).
44. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).
45. Id at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
46. Id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 14243. The measure provided that
property owners "may elect to accelerate the date of development by installing, at their own
expense, the necessary public services." Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
47. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
48. Id at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
49. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
50. Id. at 908.
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mate goal was to establish control over the quality, distribution and rate
of growth in the city.51
The Petaluma court held that the concept of the public welfare, as
served by the police power, was sufficiently broad to encompass
Petaluma's goal of preserving its small town character, open space, low
population density, and its desire to grow in an orderly and deliberate
manner. 2 The court also stated that Petaluma's plan did not unconstitu-
tionally burden interstate commerce because the plan was rationally re-
lated to the city's social and environmental welfare.53 The court pointed
out that it is "well-settled that a state regulation validly based on the
police power does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce where
the regulation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor op-
erates to disrupt its required uniformity."54 Petaluma's plan was valid,
the court held, because it created neither of these effects.55
In Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,56 the California
Supreme Court addressed how to determine whether a growth control
measure, as an exercise of a city's police power, bears a substantial and
reasonable relationship to the public welfare. The court proposed a
three-part test: (1) what is the probable effect and duration of the ordi-
nance; (2) what are the competing interests affected by the ordinance (for
example, environmental protection versus the opportunity for people to
settle); and (3) does the ordinance, in light of its probable impact, repre-
sent a reasonable accommodation of these competing interests?5"
The court held that when considering these questions, the scope of
the inquiry must extend to the welfare of those people whom the measure
would affect significantly, rather than just those who currently reside in
the city enacting the measure.5 8 Thus, the court effectively required a
"regional" analysis when assessing the impact of a growth control mea-
sure upon housing. Applying this "regional" test, the Livermore court
upheld the city's growth control ordinance and found that the challeng-
ers of the ordinance had failed to show that it lacked a reasonable rela-
tionship to the welfare of citizens of the region."
An example of the need to balance competing public concerns-and
51. Id. at 901-02.
52. Id. at 908-09.
53. Id. at 909.
54. IM
55. Id.
56. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
57. I at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
58. Id. at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
59. IM at 610, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
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a topic of considerable recent interest-is the tension between the desire
to control growth and the need for affordable housing. The courts have
determined that growth control can be an appropriate exercise of the
police power." However, California also has a rather elaborate statutory
structure that is intended to promote the provision of adequate and af-
fordable housing for the state's current and future residents. 1 What
happens when the goals of growth control collide with the state's housing
goals? The answer is not clear.
Each city and county in California is required to adopt, as a part of
its general plan, a "housing element."'62 Housing elements are intended
to be the primary means of ensuring that each locality meets its "fair
share" of the region's need for housing affordable to all income groups,
including lower income households. 3 Housing elements are required to
identify and analyze existing and projected housing needs and to estab-
lish goals, policies, quantified objectives and scheduled programs to meet
those needsfr4
The statutory requirements for housing elements are the most com-
prehensive of the requirements for any general plan element,6 and are
expressions of California's strong state policy supporting the provision of
housing.6 These requirements appear, however, to contemplate a bal-
ancing of the need for housing with other matters of public concern. Sec-
tion 65583(b) of the California Government Code67 recognizes that a
city's identified housing need "may exceed available resources and the
community's ability to satisfy this need within the content of the general
plan requirements."68 In such a situation, the city is permitted to estab-
lish a housing objective reflecting fewer housing units than its fair share
of the regional allocation. 9 It is not clear, however, to what degree other
general plan policies, including slow-growth considerations, could justify
reducing the quantified housing goals.7
0
60. See supra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
61. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65913 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
62. Id §§ 65580-65589.8.
63. Id. § 65584.
64. Id § 65583.
65. See id
66. See, ag., Lesher Communications v. City of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531, 546, 802
P.2d 317, 326, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9-10 (1990); Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41
Cal. 3d 810, 820, 718 P.2d 68, 74, 226 Cal. Rptr. 81, 86 (1986).
67. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65583(b).
68. Id
69. Id
70. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore this issue fully, a fairly recent
case is worthy of mention. In Northwood Homes, Inc. v. Town of Moraga, 216 Cal. App. 3d
1197, 265 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1989), the court upheld an open space preservation ordinance
[Vol. 24:1073
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IV. THE INrIATIVE POWER AND GROWTH CONTROL IN
CALIFORNIA
Starting in the early 1900s, as a manifestation of the progressive
movement led by President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Robert La Fol-
lette of Wisconsin and Governor Hiram Johnson of California, approxi-
mately twenty-two states have adopted provisions for citizens to enact or
repeal legislation at the state or local level-known respectively as the
initiative and referendum powers.7
In some states, such as California, initiatives are presently allowed
for many land use decisions that are legislative in character.72 The states
that have rejected the use of initiatives for land use regulation rely on
several theories. Among them is the theory that land use initiatives cir-
cumvent the notice and hearing requirements otherwise applicable to the
same types of enactments (such as general plan amendments and rezon-
ings) by a city council.73 Other states rely on the proposition that the
relevant state law delegates the authority to regulate land use exclusively
to the city council, thereby precluding regulation by initiative.74 An-
other basis is the view that direct legislation regarding land use is inher-
ently inconsistent with the comprehensive approach to planning required
under the laws of many states."
The initiative process has become an especially effective means of
controlling growth in California. In general, the initiative power has tra-
ditionally enjoyed sympathetic treatment from the California courts,
adopted by initiative. Id. at 1199, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 364. The measure restricted development
of plaintiff's 113-lot residential project in the Town of Moraga. Id. at 1200, 265 Cal. Rptr. at
365. The plaintiff claimed, in part, that the measure was an invalid exercise of the police
power because it failed to accommodate the region's housing need. Id. at 1201, 265 Cal. Rptr.
at 365. The court rejected this claim, reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to show that the
measure, by restricting the development of 113 units, had a significant impact on the region's
housing supply. Id. at 1203, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 366. Furthermore, the court stated that the
housing needs identified in the general plan are "simply goals, not mandated acts." Id. at
1204, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 367. It is not clear what the ramifications of this statement might be in
the context of a challenged measure that is shown to have a substantial impact on the regional
housing supply.
71. Freilich & Guemmer, Removing Artificial Barriers to Public Participation in Land-Use
Policy: Effective Zoning and Planning by Initiative and Referenda, 21 URB. LAw. 511, 512
(1989).
72. Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 569, 685 P.2d 1152, 1157, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806
(1984); Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d
473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976). See infra notes 161-73 and accompanying
text for a discussion of California's approach to defining the character of an initiative.
73. Freilich & Guemmer, supra note 71, at 545.
74. Id. at 551.
75. I d at 550. For excellent discussions of all these theories, see id at 527-33.
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which have upheld broad interpretations of that power.76 In particular,
land use initiatives have been judicially exempted from certain require-
ments applicable to the same measures if enacted by the city council.
77
Still, the initiative power does not give legislative carte blanche to
the voters. There are significant limitations on the subject matter of initi-
ative measures, and some of these limitations are particularly applicable
to growth control enactments. 7 Further, there is some indication that
applications of the initiative power are being more closely scrutinized by
the courts, along with evidence of a new willingness to keep measures off
of the ballot entirely when they fail to pass legal muster.7 9
.4. Legal Basis and Procedure
To give the people a greater voice in government, California adopted
the initiative and referendum processes by constitutional amendment in
1911.10 The initiative power enables the voters to propose legislation and
have it placed before the electorate for possible enactment.81 The Cali-
fornia Constitution reserves the initiative power to the voters in every
California county and general law city.82 Charter cities may adopt initia-
tive and referendum provisions in their charters.
83
The procedures for exercising the local initiative process are pro-
vided in the state's Elections Code for counties,8 4 general law cities8S and
those charter cities that have adopted those procedures. To qualify an
initiative for a city's ballot under the California Elections Code, the pro-
posed ordinance must first be submitted to the city council through an
76. See, eg., Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 591, 557 P.2d at 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
77. Id. at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47 ("Procedural requirements which
govern council action... generally do not apply to initiatives, any more than the provisions of
the initiative law govern the enactment of ordinances in council." (citation omitted)).
78. See infra notes 107-89 and accompanying text.
79. Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491, 512, 754 P.2d 708,
721, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362, 375 (1988); deBottari v. City Council, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 1212,
217 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 (1985).
80. See Act of June 2, 1911, ch. 22, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1655; CAL. CONsT. art. II, §§ 8-11
(1966, amended 1976). The referendum power enables the voters to repeal recently enacted
state and local legislation. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 4050-4061 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991)
(city referenda); ia §§ 3750-3756 (county referenda). These initiative and referendum
processes were adopted, in part, as specific reactions to the dominance of the Southern Pacific
Railroad in California politics. L. TALLIAN, DIREcr DEMOCRACY 34-44 (1977).
81. CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 8.
82. Id. § 11.
83. Id. art. XI, § 8. A California city may adopt a charter for its own government. Id.
The provisions of this charter will govern instead of the provisions of the general state law with
regard to municipal affairs. Id.
84. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3700-3720 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
85. Id §§ 4000-4021.
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initiative petition bearing the signatures of not less than ten percent of
the city's registered voters.8 6 After receiving a valid petition, the city
council must either pass the proposed ordinance without change or sub-
mit the ordinance to the city electorate.8 7 If a measure is placed on the
ballot and a majority of the voters on a proposed ordinance vote in its
favor, the ordinance becomes valid and binding on the city. 8
B. Special Power of the Initiative in General, and Growth Control
Initiatives in Particular
The California courts have generally adopted a very protective
stance with regard to the initiative power. Referring to the initiative and
referendum powers, the California Supreme Court has said, "'[Lit has
long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power
wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly an-
nulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this
reserve power, courts will preserve it.' "89
The statutory provisions regarding initiatives provide another exam-
ple of the special power enjoyed by legislation enacted by initiative. An
ordinance proposed by initiative petition and adopted either by the city
council without a vote, or by the voters, cannot be repealed or amended
except by a vote of the people, unless the ordinance provides to the
contrary.90
California courts have also determined that land use regulations en-
acted by initiative are exempt from some of the procedural requirements
applicable to city council-enacted land use measures. For instance, in
Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,9 the California Supreme
Court held that an initiative zoning measure need not comply with the
general laws mandating public hearings before the planning commission
86. Id. § 4011. County requirements specify that the initiative petition must bear the sig-
natures of not less than 10 percent "of the entire vote cast in the county for all candidates for
governor at the last gubernatorial election." Id. § 3711. Initiative petitions signed by at least
15 percent of the registered voters of a city may qualify the measure for submittal at a special
election. Id. § 4010. Petitions signed by at least 20 percent of the entire vote cast for all
gubernatorial candidates at the last election may qualify a county initiative measure for a
special election. Id. § 3709. Otherwise, the measure, if voted on, will be placed on the ballot
with other measures at a regular election. IM § 4011 (cities); id. § 3711 (counties).
87. Id. § 4011 (cities); id. § 3711 (counties).
88. Id. § 4013 (cities); id. § 3719 (counties).
89. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473,
477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976) (quoting Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563-64,
11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1961)).
90. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4013 (cities); id. § 3719 (counties).
91. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
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and the city council, and giving notice to affected property owners.9 2
The court reached its conclusion by determining that the legislature did
not intend such a requirement to apply to zoning by initiative.
93
Similarly, although council-adopted land use regulations are subject
to the environmental review procedures of the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA),94 this procedural requirement is inapplicable to the
same measures when enacted by initiative.9"
Certain types of growth control measures, when enacted by the local
legislative bodies, are subject to unique procedural requirements. How-
ever, those same measures, when put in place directly by the electorate,
are treated differently. For example, under section 65863.6 of the Cali-
fornia Government Code,96 if a city adopts an ordinance under its au-
thority to enact zoning regulations to limit the number of housing units
that may be constructed annually, the ordinance must contain findings
that justify reducing the housing opportunities of the region.97 These
findings must reflect the public health, safety and welfare interests pro-
moted by the measure,9" thereby showing that the competing public in-
terests have been addressed. The California Supreme Court has held,
however, that this requirement does not apply to ordinances enacted by
initiative.
In Building Industry Association v. City of Camarillo,99 the voters of
Camarillo had adopted a restrictive growth ordinance which limited the
number of dwelling units that could be constructed in the city to 400 per
year.10° The court held that section 65863.6 does not apply to initiative
measures 10 1 The court pointed out that the" '[p]rocedural requirements
which govern council action... generally do not apply to initiatives, any
more than the provisions of the initiative law govern the enactment of
ordinances in council.' ,102 The court concluded that requiring the elec-
92. Id. at 596, 557 P.2d at 481, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
93. Id.
94. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21150-21155 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
95. Northwood Homes, Inc. v. Town of Moraga, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 1206, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 363, 369 (1989) (land use restrictions imposed by initiative not invalid for failure to
comply with CEQA); Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458, 168 Cal. Rptr. 39
(1980) (initiative adopting rent control ordinance held exempt from requirement of CEQA
review which would have applied to same measure if enacted by local legislative body).
96. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65863.6 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 41 Cal. 3d 810, 718 P.2d 68, 226 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1986).
100. Id. at 815, 718 P.2d at 70, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
101. Id. at 824, 718 P.2d at 76, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
102. Id. at 823, 718 P.2d at 76, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (quoting Associated Home Builders v.
City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 594, 557 P.2d 473, 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47 (1976)).
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torate to make the findings required by section 65863.6 would "place an
insurmountable obstacle in the path of the initiative process." 103
Similarly, under section 65302.8 of the California Government
Code,"° if a city adopts or amends a mandatory general plan element
which limits the number of housing units which may be constructed on
an annual basis, such adoption or amendment must also contain findings
that justify reducing the housing opportunities of the region.' 05 Again,
however, if the numerical restrictions are imposed by initiative, section
65302.8 does not apply.
10 6
C. Limitations on the Use of the Initiative
Although California's legislature and courts have lightened the pro-
cedural burdens on growth control measures enacted directly by voters,
the content of such measures is still subject to significant limitations.
The following subsections describe various substantive challenges to land
use initiatives, including growth control measures.
1. Improper exercise of the police power
The content of an initiative ordinance may not violate the California
or United States Constitutions. Constitutional challenges typically in-
volve claims that the growth control measure is an improper exercise of
the government's police power because it violates the due process or
equal protection rights of affected property owners. 107 Courts hold initi-
ative measures to the same standards as council-enacted measures with
regard to constitutional challenges. In Arnel Development Co. v. City of
Costa Mesa, 5 which did not involve a growth control measure but,
rather, a rezoning by initiative, the court held that "[t]he city's authority
103. Id. at 824, 718 P.2d at 76, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
104. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302.8 (West 1983).
105. Id.
106. See Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 823-24, 718 P.2d 68,
75-76, 226 Cal. Rptr. 81, 88-89 (1986).
107. See, e.g., id at 824, 718 P.2d at 76, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 89. An initiative may be chal-
lenged on a variety of constitutional bases. For example, in Hawn v. County of Ventura, an
initiative giving approval power over airport site selection to the voters of a city, but not
nearby residents of an unincorporated territory, was ruled an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection. 73 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1018, 141 Cal. Rptr. 111, 115 (1977). Additionally, in Lee
v. City of Monterey Park, plaintiffs alleged that an ordinance limiting residential development
to 100 units per year was an unconstitutional denial of due process because it was not reason-
ably related to the advancement of the public welfare. 173 Cal. App. 3d 798, 805, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 313 (1985). The trial court sustained the City's demurrer to this claim, and the
court of appeal affirmed. Id at 812, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
108. 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1981).
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under the police power is no greater than otherwise it would be simply
because the subsequent rezoning was accomplished by initiative."'' 9
Developer Arnel had proposed to construct a fifty-acre development
consisting of 127 single-family residences and 539 apartment units. 110
The city had approved a specific plan for development of the Arnel prop-
erty, and pursuant to that plan had rezoned the property for planned
residential development of both medium and low density.111 Objecting
to the developer's proposal, a neighborhood association circulated an ini-
tiative petition to rezone the property and two adjoining properties to a
lower density single-family residential designation.112 The initiative
passed.'
1 3
The trial court found that the initiative's purpose was to rezone the
property in order to defeat the Arnel project, despite the existence of an
acute shortage of moderate-income housing in the city.114 The court also
found that the rezoning designation had been selected without consider-
ing the best use of the property or various zoning alternatives." 5
On appeal, the Arnel court found that the measure suffered from
two fatal flaws. First, the court noted that the people may not use an
initiative to discriminate against a particular parcel of land, and that the
courts may properly inquire as to whether the classification scheme had
been applied fairly and impartially." 6 As the Costa Mesa ordinance
clearly would have been held invalid as arbitrary and discriminatory if
adopted by the city, it was also invalid when adopted by initiative."
7
Second, the ordinance failed because it lacked a substantial and rea-
sonable relationship to the public welfare."' The court first noted the
"regional" scope of the inquiry, stating that "municipalities are not iso-
lated islands remote from the needs and problems of the area in which
they are located; thus an ordinance, superficially reasonable from the
limited viewpoint of the municipality, may be disclosed as unreasonable
when viewed from a larger perspective.""' 9 Accordingly, the relevant
question is "whether the ordinance reasonably relates to the welfare of
109. Id at 337, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
110. Id. at 332, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
111. Id. at 333, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
112. Id. at 334, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
113. Id.
114. Id at 335, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
115. Id
116. Id. at 336, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
117. Id at 337, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
118. Id at 339, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
119. Id at 338, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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those whom it significantly affects. ' ' 120
Next, applying the three-step analysis from Building Industry Asso-
ciation v. City of Livermore,121 the court held that no attempt had been
made to accommodate the competing public interests that were present,
namely, the acute shortage of moderate-income housing in Costa Mesa
versus a desire for lower-density development.' 22 The court concluded
that "the initiative ordinance, which completely precludes development
of multiple-family residences in the area, does not effect a reasonable ac-
commodation of the competing interests on a regional basis and is there-
fore not a valid exercise of the police power."
123
A federal district court has also overturned a land use initiative on
constitutional grounds. In Fry v. City of Hayward,124 an initiative retain-
ing an open-space designation for a golf course was found to violate a
property owner's equal protection rights. 125 Absent voter approval, the
initiative precluded changes to the open-space designation for the prop-
erty, which was surrounded by residential, commercial and industrial de-
velopment.1 26 The court applied the "rational basis" standard-a very
easy standard for a city to meet-requiring only that there be a rational
basis for the city's disparate treatment of the affected property.1 27 The
court found, however, that the City of Hayward had made no showing of
any rational basis for the provisions of the initiative.12 The court re-
stated the rule that the fact that a measure is adopted by the voters,
rather than a legislative body, will not immunize it from challenge based
on constitutional grounds.'2 9
2. Inconsistency with the general plan
a "vertical" consistency
Under California law, every city and county must adopt a general
plan as the "constitution" for that jurisdiction's physical development.
130
A general plan must include, at a minimum, seven mandatory elements:
120. Id. at 339, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
121. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). See supra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Livermore three-part test.
122. Arnel, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 337-38, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
123. Id. at 340, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
124. 701 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
125. Id. at 182.
126. IAL at 180.
127. Id. at 181-82.
128. Id. at 182.
129. Id.
130. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
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(1) land use, (2) circulation, 13 1 (3) housing, (4) conservation, (5) open
space, (6) noise, and (7) safety.1 32 Generally, all other land use regula-
tions, actions or approvals must be consistent with the applicable general
plan. 133 Whether a growth control measure is consistent with the appli-
cable general plan is determined by comparing the substance of the mea-
sure with each of the elements of the, general plan, including the seven
mandatory elements and any optional elements included within the plan,
and any maps and diagrams within the various elements.
If a subordinate land use regulation, whether enacted by the legisla-
tive body or directly by the voters, is inconsistent with the applicable
general plan, a legal challenge to the regulation may result in its being
found void ab initio. For example, in deBottari v. City Council,134 a Cali-
fornia appellate court held that a proposed referendum, which would
have rejected a zoning ordinance, was invalid because, if passed, the re-
sulting zoning would have been inconsistent with the city's general
plan. 135
At the request of a landowner, the Norco City Council amended the
city's general plan and the zoning ordinance as they related to the land-
owner's property.1 36 The amended general plan and amended zoning or-
dinance permitted high density development of the property.13 7  In
response to the city council's action, another landowner submitted a ref-
erendum to repeal the amended zoning ordinance and to require low den-
sity development.' 38  The referendum, however, did not attempt to
change the general plan's amended provision permitting more dense de-
velopment.13 9  Consequently, the result of passage of the referendum
"unquestionably would be a zoning ordinance inconsistent with the
131. The circulation element is an infrastructure plan addressing the circulation of people,
goods, energy, water, sewage, storm drainage and communications. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF
PLANNING & RESEARCH, GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES 82 (1990).
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
133. See, e.g., Lesher Communications v. City of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531, 541, 802
P.2d 317, 322, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1990) (zoning ordinance); Friends of "B" Street v. City of
Hayward, 106 Cal. App. 3d 988, 989 (1980) (public works); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West
1983) (zoning); id. §§ 66473.5, 66474 (subdivision approval). A number of other states have
similar consistency requirements, including Hawaii, Oregon, and Florida. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 163.3177 (West 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-4(a) (Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 197.251 (1985).
134. 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1985).
135. Id at 1212, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
136. Id at 1207-08, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92.
137. Id at 1212, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
138. Id. at 1212, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
139. Id at 1208, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
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amended general plan."'" The court held that voters do not have the
right to reject zoning ordinances which would result in zoning inconsis-
tent with a general plan. 1 ' Had the voters subjected both the general
plan amendment and the changes to the zoning ordinance to referendum,
however, the inconsistency would have been removed, making it likely
that the referendum would have been valid.
A recent decision by the California Supreme Court, Lesher Commu-
nications v. City of Walnut Creek, 42 affirmed the rule that a zoning ordi-
nance in conflict with a general plan is invalid at the time it is passed.'43
First, the court found that the City's traffic-based growth control ordi-
nance, which was passed by initiative was, in fact, a zoning ordinance
and not a general plan amendment.'" The court then found the initia-
tive to be inconsistent with the City's general plan'45 and, therefore, void
ab initio.146
The Lesher Communications court rejected the language in Building
Industry Association v. Superior Court, 47 which had indicated that the
remedy for an ordinance found inconsistent with a general plan would be
to cure the inconsistency rather than to find the ordinance invalid. 4 '
The Building Industry court had relied on section 65860(c) of the Cali-
fornia Government Code,'49 which requires that:
In the event that a zoning ordinance becomes inconsistent with
a general plan by reason of amendment to such a plan, or to
any element of such a plan, such zoning ordinance shall be
amended within a reasonable time so that it is consistent with
the general plan as amended. 50
The Lesher Communications court held that section 65860(c) only ap-
plies to zoning ordinances that were valid when enacted, but later be-
came inconsistent with the general plan as a result of the plan's
subsequent amendment.'' The Lesher Communications court rejected
the notion that section 65860 permits validating ordinances that were
140. Id at 1210, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
141. Id at 1212, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
142. 52 Cal. 3d 531, 802 P.2d 317, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990).
143. Id at 541, 802 P.2d at 322, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
144. Id at 544, 802 P.2d at 324, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
145. Id at 545, 802 P.2d at 325, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
146. See id
147. 211 Cal. App. 3d 277, 297, 259 Cal. Rptr 325, 338-39 (1989).
148. Lesher Communications, 52 Cal. 3d at 545, 802 P.2d at 325, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
149. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65860(c) (West 1983).
150. Id
151. Lesher Communications, 52 Cal. 3d at 545, 802 P.2d at 325, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
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inconsistent with the general plan when adopted. 152
b. "horizontal" or internal consistency
In addition to the requirement that land use regulations be consis-
tent with the general plan, "horizontal" or internal consistency within
the general plan is also required.'1 3 When growth control is to be accom-
plished via a general plan amendment, there is a possibility that the
amendment will result in an internal inconsistency. For example, a
growth limiting initiative may be inconsistent with the general plan's
provisions relating to affordable housing. Any measure, whether enacted
by initiative or the legislature, that will result in inconsistency within the
general plan, is vulnerable to legal challenge.
c. legal inadequacy of the general plan
A related basis for limiting the voters' ability to enact a growth con-
trol or other land use measure is the legal inadequacy of the general plan
itself. The consistency requirement is one of consistency with a legally
adequate general plan.'5 4 Therefore, if the general plan fails to meet all
of the statutory requirements, including internal consistency, a growth
control measure intended to implement that general plan, whether en-
acted by the legislative body or the voters, may be found inconsistent
with it.' 5I For example, in Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors, I6 a Cali-
fornia appellate court found the general plan of Kern County, California
invalid because it was internally inconsistent." 7 The court held that the
zoning ordinance under review could not be consistent with an invalid
general plan.' Consequently, the zoning ordinance was invalid at the
time it was passed.
159
It is likely that many jurisdictions have general plans that are vul-
nerable to legal challenge because they lack required content, are inter-
nally inconsistent, or suffer from some other flaw. This creates a
promising avenue of attack on many land use initiatives. This approach,
however, has some built-in limitations for those who wish to develop
152. IL
153. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300.5 (West 1983).
154. Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors, 126 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704, 179 Cal. Rptr. 261,
264 (1981).
155. Resource Defense Fund v. County of Santa Cruz, 133 Cal. App. 3d 800, 806, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 371, 373-74 (1982).
156. 126 Cal. App. 3d 698, 179 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1981).
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property within the jurisdiction. A successful challenge based on general
plan inadequacy may remove an initiative from the ballot, or may result
in the initiative's invalidation if already adopted. However, it may also
act to bar a city from issuing any other discretionary land use approvals.
For example, issuance of development approvals may be prohibited be-
cause such approvals may not be granted until the general plan meets the
statutory requirements."6 Thus, a developer may hesitate to challenge a
growth-limiting initiative based on general plan inadequacy.
3. Initiatives may only enact legislative acts
The initiative power applies only to "legislative" acts.16 California
courts categorize types of land use decisions as either legislative or ad-
ministrative, rather than requiring a case-by-case determination based on
the characteristics of the individual decision, such as size of the affected
area, or its effects.1 6z Thus, in California, the adoption of, or amend-
ments to, general plans, 163 specific plans' 4 or zoning ordinances16 5 have
been held to be legislative acts; other decisions, such as variances, 66 use
permits, 67 and subdivision map approvals,16 8 have been categorized as
administrative.
169
In a variation on the "legislative acts only" theme, a California ap-
peals court recently struck down an initiative because it directed the city
council to adopt legislation, rather than adopting the legislation itself. In
Marblehead v. City of San Clemente,170 the appellate court invalidated an
initiative that tied future development to the ability to meet specified ser-
vice levels for traffic and a range of public services. 17 1 The court held
160. An example of the development-limiting effect of a determination of general plan inad-
equacy was provided in Committee For Responsible Planning v. City of Indian Wells, 209 Cal.
App. 3d 1005, 257 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1989). In that case, the city was forced to seek court
approval for all significant land use approvals while correcting its general plan, pursuant to the
procedures under section 65755 of the California Government Code, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65755 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). Committee For Responsible Planning, 209 Cal. App. 3d at
1009, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
161. Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 569, 685 P.2d 1152, 1157, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806
(1984); Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 516, 620 P.2d at 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
162. Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 516, 620 P.2d at 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
163. Yost, 36 Cal. 3d at 570, 685 P.2d at 1158, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
164. Id at 570-71, 685 P.2d at 1158, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
165. Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 525, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
166. Id at 518, 620 P.2d at 569, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
167. Id
168. Id at 523, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
169. Id at 518, 620 P.2d at 569, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
170. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1504, 277 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1991).
171. Id at 1507, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
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that the initiative, which contemplated amendments to the city's general
plan, violated the California Constitution's provisions authorizing initia-
tives.172 The measure, said the court, did not actually enact legislation,
which is the constitutional authorization. Rather, the initiative directed
the city council to enact legislation, in the form of a general plan amend-
ment, in order to implement the policies in the initiative.173
4. Impairment of an essential governmental function
An initiative may not interfere with the efficacy of an essential gov-
ernmental power, such as a city's power to grant a franchise 74 or site a
courthouse. 175  This limitation applies even if the initiative ordinance is
legislative, rather than administrative, in nature.1 76 The limitation has
been relied upon as the basis for voiding an initiative which would impair
a city's fiscal management abilities. 177 This is a judicial extension of the
constitutional limitation on statewide referenda regarding tax matters.
171
5. Conflict with state law
General law limits cities in the exercise of their police power to en-
acting ordinances which will not conflict with provisions of general state
law. 179 This limitation applies to measures adopted either by the city
council or by the voters directly. 80 Thus, for example, a local initiative
that granted a franchise for a toll-bridge was invalidated because precon-
ditions set by state law, such as obtaining the approval of the State Engi-
neer, were not met.18 1 This restriction does not apply to charter cities
with regard to municipal affairs.' 2 With regard to matters of statewide
concern, however, even charter cities will be precluded from enacting
measures that conflict with state law, whether by council action or
172. Id. at 1510, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
173. Id
174. Newsom v. Board of Supervisors, 205 Cal. 262, 271-72, 270 P. 676, 680 (1928).
175. Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 134, 222 P.2d 225, 230 (1950).
176. Id
177. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 143, 550 P.2d 1001, 1012, 130
Cal. Rptr. 465, 476 (1976) (initiative is invalid if it will impair, for example, city's ability to
meet its fiscal management responsibilities); City of Atascadero v. Daly, 135 Cal. App. 3d 466,
470, 185 Cal. Rptr. 228, 230 (1982) (initiative is invalid if it will impede city's taxing powers).
178. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a).
179. Id. art. XI, § 7.
180. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 675, 669 P.2d 17, 27, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781,
791 (1983); Galvin v. Board of Supervisors, 195 Cal. 686, 235 P. 450 (1925).
181. Galvin, 195 Cal. at 696-98, 235 P. at 451.
182. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
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initiative. 183
In Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court,'84 the California
Supreme Court found invalid an initiative measure proposed in the char-
ter city of Irvine, because it would have required voter approval for the
imposition of certain developer fees for the construction of major new
roads. 8 ' The court found that road construction of the type contem-
plated by the California statute authorizing the fees 186 was a matter of
statewide concern, rather than a strictly municipal affair.'8 7 The court
also found that California law grants exclusive authority to impose such
fees to the Orange County Board of Supervisors and to the city councils
within Orange County, rather than to the voters.'18  Thus, the court
held, the voters' enactment of a voter-approval requirement for the impo-
sition of the fees conflicted with and was preempted by the provisions of
state law. 189
D. Pre-election Challenges to Initiatives
The California courts appear to be showing an increased willingness
to review an initiative or referendum measure for legal validity prior to
its submission to the electorate. 90 The effect of a successful pre-election
challenge can be substantial. If an initiative is kept off the ballot by a
pre-election challenge, and the court's determination of the measure's in-
validity is subsequently appealed, the initiative ordinance is inoperative
unless and until the appeals process is successful, and the initiative is
later enacted. If, however, the initiative is enacted by the voters, and is
subsequently challenged in court, the initiative ordinance remains in ef-
fect until the judicial process, including appeals, has been exhausted. For
example, a growth management measure enacted in Walnut Creek, Cali-
fornia in November 1985 and challenged in Lesher Communications v.
City of Walnut Creek,191 was found invalid by the trial court in February
of 1987. The measure's limitations remained in effect, however, until the
California Supreme Court's decision affirming the trial court in Decem-
183. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 483
(1969).
184. 45 Cal. 3d 491, 754 P.2d 708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988).
185. Id. at 495, 754 P.2d at 709, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
186. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66484.3 (West Supp. 1991).
187. Committee of Seven Thousand, 45 Cal. 3d at 507, 754 P.2d at 717, 247 Cal. Rptr. at
371.
188. Id at 505, 754 P.2d at 716, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
189. Id at 509, 754 P.2d at 719, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
190. See, e.g., id at 498-99, 754 P.2d at 711-12, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66 (action for writ of
mandate commenced to prevent placement of initiative on ballot).
191. 52 Cal. 3d 531, 802 P.2d 317, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990).
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ber 1990.192
Although courts generally prefer post-election review, in some cases
a court will undertake to determine a measure's validity prior to its sub-
mission to the electorate. The decision to make such a determination,
however, lies wholly within the discretionary power of the court.1 93
Generally, courts weigh two competing values. On one hand, courts are
concerned with preventing the waste of public funds.1 9 4 On the other
hand, courts are aware of the need to allow the public to vote because
only then can the purposes of the initiative and referendum be
achieved. 9 ' Balancing these concerns is relatively straightforward when
a measure is invalid on its face. Where the issues are not so apparent, it
is difficult to predict when a court will agree to review an initiative or
referendum measure prior to an election. If a court does find a measure
facially invalid, it will order either that the measure be removed from the
ballot or that any vote taken be disregarded.
In deBottari v. City Council,19 6 the California Court of Appeal con-
sidered the appropriateness of pre-election judicial review in the context
of a referendum measure which sought to repeal rezoning ordinances en-
acted by the city council.1 97 After a referendum petition was successfully
circulated, the city council refused to either repeal the ordinances or sub-
mit the referendum to the voters as required by section 4055 of the Cali-
fornia Elections Code.198 The council relied on its determination that
repeal of the ordinances would result in zoning inconsistent with the
city's general plan. The court first determined that the city council had a
mandatory duty under the referendum laws either to repeal the chal-
lenged ordinances or to submit them to referendum unless "'directed to
do otherwise by a court on a compelling showing that a proper case has
been established for interfering with the [referendum] power.' "199 The
court went on to assess whether such a showing had been made by the
city council.'
As an initial matter, the deBottari court noted two exceptions to the
192. Id. at 538, 802 P.2d at 320-21, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
193. deBottari v. City Council, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 1209, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790, 793
(1985).
194. Sea eg., Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 257, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (1972).
195. See, eg., id at 257-58, 101 Cal. Rptr at 634.
196. 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1985).
197. Id. at 1209-10, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
198. Id at 1208, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 792; see CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4055 (West 1977 & Supp.
1991).
199. deBottari, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 1209, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (quoting Farley v. Healey,
67 Cal. 2d 325, 327, 431 P.2d 650, 652, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1967)).
200. Id at 1210-12, 217 Cal. Rptr at 793-94.
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general rule that" 'it is usually more appropriate to review constitutional
and other challenges to... initiative measures after an election rather
than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the exercise of the
people's franchise.' "201 First, a court may review challenges to initiative
measures prior to an election where the electorate "lacks the 'power to
adopt the proposal,'" as when the initiative proposed would affect an
administrative, rather than a legislative, matter.202 Second, a court may
review a measure prior to a vote when "the substantive provisions of the
proposed measure are legally invalid."2 "3
The court analyzed the referendum at issue in deBottari under the
second of these exceptions. It held that because repeal of the zoning or-
dinance would result in the property being zoned in a manner inconsis-
tent with the city's general plan, the "invalidity of the proposed
referendum [had] been clearly and compellingly demonstrated, '2 "4 and
the "referendum, if successful, would enact a clearly invalid zoning ordi-
nance." 205 The court noted that: "Judicial deference to the electoral
process does not compel judicial apathy towards patently invalid legisla-
tive acts."
20 6
Under the deBottari rule, a challenging party might be successful if
it could show, for example, that an initiative is inconsistent with the
city's general plan or would cause the general plan to become internally
inconsistent.20 7 Such inconsistencies could be shown by a report ordered
by the city council pursuant to sections 3705.5 or 4009.5 of the California
Elections Code,2°0 which authorize city councils and county boards of
supervisors to request reports on the fiscal, land use and other effects of a
proposed initiative." 9 For example, if the report requested by a city
council shows that an initiative would be inconsistent with the city's gen-
eral plan, the challenger could use that official report as the basis for
urging the council to refuse to put the measure on the ballot. Alterna-
201. Id. at 1209, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (quoting Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d
200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1982)).
202. Id. (quoting Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 641 P. 2d 200, 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100,
102 (1982) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)).
203. Id. at 1210, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
204. Id. at 1212, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
205. Id at 1213, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
206. Id.
207. Concerned Citizens v. Board of Supervisors, 166 Cal. App. 3d 90, 95, 212 Cal. Rptr.
273, 276-77 (1985); Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors, 126 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 261, 264 (1981).
208. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3705.5, 4009.5 (West Supp. 1991).
209. Id.
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tively, a challenger could use the report as the basis for seeking a court
order to keep the initiative off the ballot.
The California Supreme Court upheld the pre-election invalidation
of a proposed initiative measure in Committee of Seven Thousand v. Su-
perior Court.21 ° There, the court found that the measure was correctly
kept off of the ballot because it conflicted with state law.2"
In addition to substantive flaws in an initiative measure, courts have
upheld pre-election challenges based on technical flaws in the initiative
petition itself or elsewhere in the initiative procedure." 2 Initiative oppo-
nents, hungry for a basis for defeating a proposed measure, have fre-
quently looked to procedural deficiencies as a means of accomplishing
their ends.2"' Such procedural flaws will be a basis for invalidation, how-
ever, only if the purpose for the technical requirement is frustrated by the
flaw.214
Under this rule, pre-election challenges to initiatives and referenda
have been upheld because: a referendum petition contained only the
number and title of the challenged ordinance rather than its complete
text;215 a referendum petition failed to include an exhibit setting forth the
technical legal description and location of the affected real property;
216
and, an initiative petition was signed after notice of intent to circulate the
petition was published, but prior to that notice being posted.
217
E. Conflicting Initiatives on the Same Ballot
A phenomenon that appears to be increasingly common on the local
level, as well as in California's statewide elections, is for competing initia-
210. 45 Cal. 3d 491, 509, 754 P.2d 708, 719, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362, 373 (1988).
211. Id. at 495, 754 P.2d at 709, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 363. Because Irvine is a charter city,
conflict with state law is a basis for invalidation only if a measure addresses a matter of state-
wide concern. Id. at 505-07, 754 P.2d at 716, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71. Seesupra notes 184-89
for a discussion of the Committee of Seven Thousand decision.
212. See, eg., Lesher Communications, 52 Cal. 3d at 531, 802 P.2d at 318, 277 Cal. Rptr. at
2.
213. See, eg., Insurance Indus. Initiative Campaign Comm'n v. Eu, 203 Cal. App. 3d 961,
250 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1988) (plaintiff claimed initiative violated single subject rule).
214. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 652-53, 639 P.2d 939, 948, 180 Cal. Rptr.
297, 306 (1982).
215. Creighton v. Reviczky, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 1229, 217 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836 (1985).
A referendum petition must contain the complete text of the challenged ordinance. CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 4052 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
216. Chase v. Brooks, 187 Cal. App. 3d 657, 664, 232 Cal. Rptr. 65, 70 (1986). Exhibits are
required pursuant to CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4052.
217. Ibarra v. City of Carson, 214 Cal. App. 3d 90, 99-100, 262 Cal. Rptr. 485, 490 (1989).
Notice must be posted prior to signature pursuant to CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4002(a) (West Supp.
1991).
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tives to appear on the same ballot.21 The California Elections Code ad-
dresses the question of competing initiatives on the same ballot and
provides that, if the provisions of two or more ordinances adopted at the
same election conflict, the ordinance receiving the highest number of af-
firmative votes shall control.
219
Some initiatives have attempted to ensure applicability of these pro-
visions of state law by including a "killer clause" as part of the initia-
tive.220 A "killer clause" will state that the measure's provisions are
intended to, and do, conflict with the provisions of a rival initiative.
Thus, the initiative receiving the most votes should "kill" the rival initia-
tive, even if both pass.
221
An example of the efficacy of Elections Code sections 3713 and
4016, and of a "killer clause," was provided in Concerned Citizens v. City
of Carlsbad.222 In Carlsbad, the California Court of Appeal ruled that a
city can refuse to enforce a citizens' initiative that had been passed by the
voters where the city's own ballot measure on the same subject, which
was inconsistent with the citizens' initiative, received more affirmative
votes.
223
Concerned Citizens presented the City of Carlsbad with an initiative
(Proposition G) to regulate housing development for a ten year period.224
The measure would have created annual limits on new residential con-
struction.225 In response to Proposition G, the city council placed an
alternative measure on the ballot, Proposition E, which tied the rate of
development to the development of new public facilities.226 In its "killer
clause," Proposition E stated that it was inconsistent with Proposition
G.227 The voters passed both measures, but the council's measure re-
ceived more votes.228 Accordingly, the council enacted Proposition E
and refused to enact Proposition G.229
Concerned Citizens sought to have Proposition G enforced, claim-
218. See, e.g., Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n,
51 Cal. 3d 744, 799 P.2d 1220, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990) (both measures regulating political
campaign contributions and spending).
219. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3717 (West 1977) (counties); id. § 4016 (cities).
220. See, e.g., Taxpayers, 51 Cal. 3d at 747, 799 P.2d at 1221, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
221. Id. at 767, 799 P.2d at 1234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
222. 204 Cal. App. 3d 937, 251 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1988).
223. Id. at 943, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
224. Id. at 939, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
225. Id.
226. Id
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ing that it was not inconsistent with Proposition E.2 30 The court of ap-
peal held that Proposition E was clearly inconsistent with Proposition G,
stating that Proposition E expressed "an unambiguous intent to supplant
any [annual] numerical limit [on the rate of residential construction]. 231
A recent California Supreme Court decision involved rival statewide
initiatives passed on the same ballot, but is likely applicable to local ini-
tiatives as well. In Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Polit-
ical Practices Commission,2 the California court addressed the degree to
which the provisions of two measures dealing with political campaign
reform should be made operative. The court relied on Article II, Section
10(b) of the California Constitution, which states that if provisions of
two or more measures approved at the same election conflict, those of the
measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.233 The court
noted that each of the competing measures established a comprehensive
regulatory scheme.234
The Taxpayers court rejected the notion that only those provisions
from the "losing" measure that conflict with the provisions of the mea-
sure obtaining more affirmative votes, and those provisions that cannot
be severed from the conflicting provisions, need be invalidated.23 5
Rather, the court held that section 10(b) does not permit the court to
engraft onto one regulatory scheme provisions intended to be part of a
different scheme.2 36 The court held:
[U]nless a contrary intent is apparent in competing, conflicting
initiative measures which address and seek to comprehensively
regulate the same subject, only the provisions of the measure
receiving the highest affirmative vote become operative upon
adoption. If the measures propose alternative regulatory
schemes, a fundamental conflict exists. In those circumstances,
[the constitution] does not require or permit either the court or
the agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the
measure or measures to enforce any of the provisions of the
measure which received the lesser affirmative vote.237
230. Id.
231. Id
232. 51 Cal. 3d 744, 799 P.2d 1220, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990).
233. IdL at 764, 799 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
234. L at 770-71, 799 P.2d at 1236-37, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
235. Id. at 747, 799 P.2d at 1221, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
236. Id
237. Id. at 770-71, 799 P.2d at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
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In a footnote, the court addressed when provisions of a "losing" measure
may be given effect:
Our construction of [the constitution] does not foreclose opera-
tion of an initiative measure that receives an affirmative vote
simply because one or more minor provisions happen to con-
ffict with those of another initiative principally addressed to
other aspects of the same general subject. In the latter circum-
stance, if the principal purpose of the initiative can be accom-
plished notwithstanding the excision of the minor, incidental
conflicting provisions, the remainder of the initiative can be
given effect.238
V. REACTIONS TO INCREASED USE OF INITIATIVES TO EFFECT
GROWTH CONTROL
There has been a variety of reactions to the increased use of initia-
tives in California as a tool to control growth. For instance, on a practi-
cal level, developers appear to be taking heightened interest in the use of
two California statutory provisions that allow an early vesting of devel-
opment rights, thereby providing insulation from subsequently enacted
growth management measures. On a policy level, an increasing number
of voices are questioning the long term advisability of allowing land use
policy to be determined directly by the voters. There has even been some
indication from the California Supreme Court that it would be receptive
to hearing the question of whether local initiatives to amend general
plans may exceed the scope of the initiative power.
A. Developer Interest in Vesting Development Rights via Statutory
Mechanisms
Once a developer has a vested right to develop, that developer is
largely immune from subsequent governmental actions that would pre-
clude that development.239 Consistent with the general rule that the vot-
ers may not do by initiative what the city council cannot do,2" an
initiative may not interfere with a vested right to develop. Thus, when a
right to develop vests can be of real importance.
238. Id. at 771 n.12, 799 P.2d at 1236-37 n.12, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04 n.12.
239. Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791,
553 P.2d 546, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
240. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 337, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723,
727 (1981) (initiative that defeated rezoning for city development plan held invalid where same
action by city council would be arbitrary and discriminatory).
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1. Common law vested rights doctrine in California
Under common law in California, the right to develop vests late in
the development game. In Avco Community Developers v. South Coast
Regional Commission,24 the California Supreme Court reiterated the
rule that not until a developer has obtained a building permit for its pro-
ject, has completed substantial work and has incurred substantial liabili-
ties in reliance on that permit, may the developer claim a vested right to
finish the project within the scope of the permit.242 The developer may
not rely on land use regulations in effect when the property was acquired,
when preliminary steps to development were taken, or when pre-building
permit approvals, such as general plan amendments, rezonings or subdi-
vision map or development plan approvals were obtained.243 Thus, be-
cause the right to develop vests at such a late stage, a developer is often
vulnerable to substantial losses of time and money if the applicable land
use regulations change prior to obtaining a vested right.
2. Property development agreements
In an attempt to blunt Avco Community Developers' late vesting
rule, the California legislature, at the request of the building industry,
authorized use of property development agreements (development agree-
ments).2' A development agreement is an agreement between a prop-
erty owner and a city under which the city agrees to apply to the subject
property, unless provided otherwise by agreement, the policies, rules and
regulations in effect at the time the development agreement was entered
into.245 In this way, the property owner is able to obtain protection
against a subsequently enacted amendment to the general plan, zoning
ordinance, or other land use regulation, whether enacted by the legisla-
tive body or by the voters through an initiative. Whether or not a sub-
sequently enacted growth management measure that could delay
construction will apply to property which is the subject of a development
agreement may depend on the terms of the agreement itself. Although a
development agreement was not involved, Pardee Construction Co. v.
241. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977).
242. Id at 791, 553 P.2d at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
243. Id. at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
244. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). Several other states
have development agreement statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05 (1990);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-68-101 to -106 (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3220-.3243 (West
1990); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 46-121 to -132 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.0201
(Michie 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-45.2 (West Supp. 1990).
245. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65866. The parties may, however, agree otherwise. See id.
1100 [Vol. 24:1073
GROWTH CONTROL BY THE BALLOT BOX
City of Camarillo2  is instructive regarding this point. In Pardee Con-
struction, the right to develop a specific piece of property was guaranteed
by a stipulated judgment resulting from the settlement of a lawsuit,
rather than by a development agreement.247 The court characterized the
stipulated judgment as being in the nature of a contract.24 8 The court
held that a voter-enacted annual cap on residential development did ap-
ply to the property that was the subject of the stipulated judgment be-
cause the growth cap did not impair the terms of the stipulated
judgment.249 The Pardee Construction court found that the city, includ-
ing the voters using the initiative, was free to regulate all matters not
covered by the stipulated judgment and that the stipulated judgment did
not expressly address the pace of development.
In order to avoid these consequences, some property owners have
negotiated into their development agreements provisions that expressly
address the timing of development. In this way, they hope to protect
themselves from growth control measures that would delay build-out of
their projects.
It should be noted that the legality of development agreements
under this statute has not yet been tested in the courts. There is some
question as to whether a city can contract away the future use of its
police power.2  Still, developer interest in the use of development agree-
ments shows no sign of abating. This interest seems to be based, at least
in part, on the increased volatility of land use regulation caused by the
use of initiatives.
3. Vesting tentative maps
As another legislative response to Avco Community Developers, in
1984 California established a new statutory procedure for subdivisions-
the "vesting tentative map."251 The vesting tentative map statute gives
subdividers who obtain approval of a vesting tentative map the right to
proceed with development which is in substantial compliance with local
ordinances, policies and standards in effect at the time the map applica-
tion is complete.252
246. 37 Cal. 3d 465, 690 P.2d 701, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1984).
247. Id. at 468, 690 P.2d at 703, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
248. Id. at 471, 690 P.2d at 705, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
249. Id. at 472, 690 P.2d at 706, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33.
250. See Curtin & Skaggs, Legal Issues and Considerations, in DEVELOPMENT AGREE-
MENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS 1, 121 (1989).
251. Act of Sept. 13, 1984, ch. 113, § 8, 1984 Cal. Stat. 3740, 3744-46 (codified as amended
at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66498.1-66498.9 (West Supp. 1991)).
252. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66498.1(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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To our knowledge, there is only one court decision to date dealing
with the vesting effect of a vesting tentative map. In Davidon Homes v.
City of Pleasant Hill,25 3 a trial court examined an initiative imposing a
retroactive freeze on rezonings that resulted in increased density. The
court held that the retroactive freeze did not nullify a vested right to
develop in accordance with a vesting tentative map.25 4
In Davidon Homes, the city council had rezoned the project site and
later approved a vesting tentative map for a sixty-nine-unit residential
subdivision.2 5 Three weeks after the map was approved, an initiative
containing the retroactive limitation on rezonings was enacted.256 The
city then refused to process a final subdivision map, claiming that the
subdivision conflicted with the initiative's density limitations, and that
the initiative operated to revoke the vested rights granted through the
vesting tentative map.257 The court rejected that argument, holding that
the vesting tentative map prevails over a subsequently adopted land use
initiative.25 8 The city did not appeal this court decision.
B. Criticisms of the Use of the Initiative for Land Use Measures
A relatively small, but perhaps significant, backlash to the use of
initiatives to enact land use measures-particularly those with the far-
reaching impacts of growth control measures-has begun to surface in
California and elsewhere. At the core of the most valid criticisms of land
use initiatives is the contention that such measures make good land use
planning difficult, if not impossible.259 The hallmarks of good land use
planning are that decisions are well informed, the planning process is
flexible and responsive to changing circumstances and values, and that
decisions reflect a comprehensive planning process and accommodate
competing public interests. Arguably, each of these goals is thwarted
when land use planning is achieved via the ballot box.
Critics of land use initiatives claim that voters never have as much
information available to them in making land use decisions as a profes-
sional planning staff, planning commission or city council does. More
specifically, the fact that initiatives are exempt from the requirement of
253. No. 297988, slip op. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1987).
254. Id at 4.
255. Id. at 2.
256. Id. at 2-3.
257. Id. at 3-4.
258. Id. at 4.
259. See, eg., Freilich & Guemmer, supra note 71, at 519-20; Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 866-67
(1983).
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environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) means that decisions with a potentially enormous environmen-
tal impact may be made without the extensive review that CEQA
requires.260
These concerns were recently highlighted by the California Supreme
Court in Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Prac-
tices Commission:
261
We observed many years ago that even the most conscien-
tious voters may lack the time to study ballot measures with
that degree of thoroughness. Noting the tendency of voters to
rely on the title to describe the content of an initiative, we
agreed implicitly with the Supreme Court of Oregon whose ob-
servation we quoted.
"'The majority of qualified electors are so much interested
in managing their own affairs that they have no time carefully
to consider measures affecting the general public. A great
number of voters undoubtedly have a superficial knowledge of
proposed laws to be voted upon .... We think the assertion
may safely be ventured that it is only the few persons who ear-
nestly favor or zealously oppose the passage of a proposed law
initiated by petition who have attentively studied its contents
and know how it will probably affect their private interests.
The greater number of voters do not possess this information
and usually derive their knowledge of the contents of a pro-
posed law from an inspection of the title thereof, which is some-
times secured only from the very meager details afforded by a
ballot which is examined in an election booth preparatory to
exercising the right of suffrage.'"
Those observations are no less pertinent today. "Voters
have neither the time nor the resources to mount an in depth
investigation of a proposed initiative. Often voters rely solely
on the title and summary of the proposed initiative and never
examine the actual wording of the proposal.
'262
This issue was addressed to some degree in the 1987 amendments to
the California Elections Code.2 63 Under these amendments, when a peti-
260. Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458, 461, 168 Cal. Rptr. 39, 40 (1980);
see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
261. 51 Cal. 3d 744, 799 P.2d 1220, 274 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990).
262. Id. at 770, 799 P.2d at 1236, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 803 (citations omitted).
263. Act of Sept. 18, 1987, ch. 767, § 15, 1987 Cal. Stat. 2438 (codified as amended at CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 4009.5 (West Supp. 1991)).
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tion for an initiative measure is circulated, a city council may request and
receive reports from any city agency on such issues as the measure's fiscal
impact, its effect on the internal consistency of the city's general and
specific plans, the consistency between planning and zoning, environmen-
tal impact, and any other matters the council identifies.2" The insights
which might result from such reports, however, can only influence the
council's decision to enact the initiative measure or place it on the ballot,
or the voters' decision on whether to enact the measure should it be
placed before them. The measure itself may not be changed from its
form when circulated for signature.26- Thus, these council-ordered re-
ports are very different from environmental impact reports prepared
under CEQA, which often have the effect of modifying the land use deci-
sions under review.
The charge that land use initiatives frustrate the flexibility and re-
sponsiveness to change that are required of good land use planning is
supported by the fact that generally, ordinances adopted by local initia-
tive may not be repealed or amended except by a subsequent vote of the
electorate.266 This statutory provision stands to reason; the purpose for
granting the initiative power-empowering an electorate confronted by
an unresponsive legislative body-would be vitiated by allowing the leg-
islative body to "undo" what the people have accomplished through the
initiative. As a result, however, a land use regulation adopted by initia-
tive may be very difficult to amend. Even though the concerns that
prompted the measure's passage may have subsided, generating sufficient
voter interest in updating or repealing the measure to conform to
changed circumstances may present a real problem. Further, regulations
appropriate for a particular period in a city's development may linger
well past their usefulness and may, in fact, impede orderly development.
This provision attracted the California Supreme Court's attention in
Lesher Communications v. City of Walnut Creek.267 The Lesher Commu-
nications court noted that it had never been called upon to consider
whether a general plan may be adopted or amended by initiative and
noted that it was not now required to address the issue.268 The court
264. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4009.5 (West Supp. 1991). For comparable provisions regarding
county initiatives, see id. § 3705.5.
265. Id. § 3711 (counties) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); id. § 4011 (cities).
266. Id. § 3719 (West 1977) (counties); id. § 4013 (cities).
267. 52 Cal. 3d 531, 802 P.2d 317, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990).
268. Id. at 539, 802 P.2d at 321, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 4. The California Supreme Court has
held that, because adoption of a general plan is a legislative act, the referendum power is
applicable. Id. (citing Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 685 P.2d 1152, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801
(1984)). Furthermore, both the initiative and referendum powers have been held applicable to
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stated, however, that "[s]everal amici curiae argue that, because compli-
ance with the numerous substantive provisions of the Planning and Zon-
ing Law can be achieved only by a legislative body, that law preempts the
initiative power.' ' 269 The court referred to statements of amici regarding
section 65358 of the California Government Code,2 70 which authorizes
general plan amendments by the "legislative body."2 7 Such amend-
ments may be precluded by a general plan amendment enacted by initia-
tive, because the terms of such an amendment may only be amended or
repealed by another vote of the people.272 The court expressed some con-
cern over the validity of such an outcome:
One not inconsequential impact of the enactment of a munici-
pal initiative is the statutory requirement that any future
amendment of the initiative ordinance be submitted to the vot-
ers for approval. As the Court of Appeal recognized, that stat-
ute may apply to limit the power to amend a general plan given
the legislative body by section 65358. If so, an initiative
amendment might impermissibly limit the authority and re-
sponsibility of the legislative body to periodically review and
amend the general plan.273
It remains to be seen whether the court's expressed concerns could
blossom into decisions invalidating those general plan amendments en-
acted by initiative. This outcome seems most likely with those initiatives
of unlimited or lengthy operative effect that could not be amended by the
legislative body.
Another disturbing aspect of land use initiatives is that the balanc-
ing of competing public interests may be lost from the land use planning
and regulation process. In upholding Propositionl3, California's tax re-
form initiative enacted in 1978,274 the California Supreme Court charac-
terized the initiative as a" 'legislative battering ram,'" which is deficient
as a means of lawmaking in that it permits very little balancing of inter-
zoning ordinances. Id (citing Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d
565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 672 n.5, 146
Cal. Rptr. 687, 690 n.5 (1978)).
269. Id.
270. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65358 (West Supp. 1991).
271. Id
272. Lesher Communications, 52 Cal. 3d at 539 n.7, 802 P.2d at 320 n.7, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 4
n.7; see CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3719, 4013. An exception applies when the initiative itself per-
mits repeal or amendment other than by a subsequent vote of the electorate.
273. Lesher Communications, 52 Cal. 3d at 540 & n.8, 802 P.2d at 322 & n.8, 277 Cal. Rptr.
at 5 & n.8.
274. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6.
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ests or compromise .2 7  Evidence of this is the fact that initiative meas-
ures which place numerical restrictions on housing development are
exempt from the requirement of findings that address health, safety and
welfare concerns.276 Likewise, the fact that CEQA's environmental re-
view provisions do not apply to initiative measures2 77 means that the bal-
ancing procedures which are a part of that process do not come to bear.
A blanket statement that initiative measures are completely free of
requirements to balance competing interests would, however, be inaccu-
rate. The three-part balancing test set forth in Associated Home Builders
v. City of Livermore 27s requires an inquiry into how competing interests
were balanced in order to find that the initiative measure bears a reason-
able relationship to a legitimate governmental interest and is, thus, a
valid exercise of the police power.279
Still, initiative measures often provide narrow solutions to mul-
tifaceted problems. To the degree that this is true, they may stand in the
way of effective planning, which by nature must be comprehensive and
must consider the interrelationship between a host of factors.
VI. CONCLUSION: OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
The use of local initiatives to enact growth control measures has
enjoyed tremendous popularity in California. Recent election results,
however, find less than half of the growth control initiatives successful.
Several explanations for this result have been advanced, such as the
emergence of more sophisticated and better-funded opposition cam-
paigns, and an increasingly savvy electorate which is less likely to accept
simplistic solutions to growth-related problems.
These explanations suggest that the nature of growth control initia-
tives may change somewhat. Successful initiatives in the future may oc-
cur more frequently in smaller jurisdictions, where proponents are less
likely to be overwhelmed by well-funded opposition efforts. Also, growth
control activists may attempt to draft future measures with a broader
appeal and with the ability to better withstand more critical analysis.
In addition, the recent decision in Lesher Communications v. City of
275. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 228-29, 583 P.2d 1281, 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 247 (1978) (quoting V. KEY & W.
CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 485 (1939)).
276. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
278. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
279. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Livermore test.
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Walnut Creek2"' may indicate that the California Supreme Court would
be receptive to a challenge asserting that general plan amendments, or at
least some types of general plan amendments, are beyond the scope of the
initiative power. Undoubtedly, such challenges will be made.
Despite the more recent election results, however, and what may be
hints by California's highest court, it seems premature to announce the
demise of growth control by the ballot box. At the root of this move-
ment are strong feelings held by large numbers of the state's voters that
problems associated with growth are not being adequately addressed by
state and local legislators. The movement must also be attributed to the
fact that California law is particularly well suited to accommodate these
measures. As long as these two factors are present, it is likely that
growth control measures enacted by the voters will continue to be a part
of California's political scene.
280. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
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